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Low-Paid Workers and On-the-Job 
Training in Canada
ISIK U. ZEYTINOGLU
GORDON B. COOKE
KARLENE HARRY
JAMES CHOWHAN1
This paper provides evidence of on-the-job training for low-
paid workers in Canada and examines workplace and individual 
factors associated with their on-the-job training. The study uses 
Statistics Canada’s Workplace and Employee Survey (WES) 2001 
data. Results show that less than a quarter of low-paid workers 
received on-the-job training in 2001 as compared to one third 
of higher-paid workers. A decomposition of regression models 
indicated that this substantive gap is statistically significant. With 
the shrinking labour force, ongoing skills development is needed 
to enable workers to earn a decent living, fulfill their work-related 
goals, and contribute to the current and future productivity of their 
workplaces and the economy. We recommend governments provide 
support for low-paid workers’ on-the-job training.
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In recent decades a polarization has appeared in the Canadian labour 
market with some workers having favourable working conditions and 
others enduring poor working conditions (Betcherman and Lowe, 1997). 
Income inequality has grown (Moore and Pacey, 2003), and there is growing 
disparity in hourly wage rates (Johnson and Kuhn, 2004) and benefits 
coverage (Zeytinoglu and Cooke, 2005). While the real GDP per worker has 
increased by 22% between 1989 and 2004, real after-tax income per worker 
increased only 4% over this fifteen-year period (Drummond and Caranci, 
2005). There is now a substantial segment of the labour force in jobs that 
have unfavourable conditions of employment, job insecurity or downward 
economic mobility (Chaykowski, 2005). The vulnerable workers series 
of the Canadian Policy Research Networks showed many unfavourable 
aspects of these workers’ work lives and a lack of employment-related 
social protection (see, for example, Chaykowski, 2005; Saunders, 2003 
and 2006; Vallée, 2005).
Many terminologies, such as vulnerable workers (Saunders, 2003), low-
paid workers (Chung, 2004; Saunders, 2005), lower-wage at-risk workers 
(Verma and Mann, 2006), working poor (US Department of Labor, 2005) 
or low-wage workers (Appelbaum, Bernhardt and Murnane, 2003; Holzer, 
Lane and Vilhuber, 2004) are used to define workers who are at the poor 
end of the employment spectrum. While there are some differences in the 
coverage of these terminologies, they essentially refer to workers who 
experience economic vulnerability. In this paper we focus on low-paid 
regular full-time workers. We define these workers as those in regular 
(continuous) employment contracts, employed for full-time hours and paid 
less than $10 per hour (in 2001) which includes all those earning at, or 
near, the minimum wage. Rather than using the longer but more accurate 
“low-paid regular full-time workers” terminology, for the rest of the paper 
we refer to these workers as “low-paid workers.” Using 2001 Census data, 
Chung (2004) found that in 2000 roughly 16% of all full-time employees 
in Canada received relatively low earnings—less than $375 per week.
For all workers, learning, particularly job skills training and skills 
upgrading, is an integral part of maintaining their competitive employability 
profile (OECD 2006a; Statistics Canada, 1997). However, research suggests 
that employers in Canada are under-investing in training (Goldenberg, 
2006). About a third of Canadian workers are trained on-the-job in Canada 
(Zeytinoglu and Cooke, 2006), but little is known about the extent of on-
the-job training among low-paid workers. A study conducted in the Toronto 
area shows a low incidence of training among these workers (Verma and 
Mann, 2006), and as Berg and Frost (2005) show, training is a critical 
factor for low-paid workers’ perceptions of dignity. The vulnerable workers 
research suggests that low-paid workers do not receive on-the-job training 
(Saunders, 2006).
3 Zeytinoglu p 5 a.indd   6 2008-03-15   09:28:44
7LOW-PAID WORKERS AND ON-THE-JOB TRAINING IN CANADA
The purposes of this paper are to provide evidence of on-the-job training 
for low-paid workers as compared to higher-paid1 workers in Canada and 
to examine workplace and individual factors associated with their on-the-
job training. The study uses Statistics Canada’s Workplace and Employee 
Survey (WES) 2001 data. The unit of analysis is the individual worker and 
data linking employee responses to workplace (i.e. employer) responses 
are used.
This study is important for two reasons. First, understanding the extent 
of on-the-job training and factors associated with training of low-paid 
workers can lead to better informed policies. Such policies can improve 
workers’ performance, enable them to quickly adjust to technological 
changes, improve earnings, and contribute to their workplaces’ productivity. 
Second, in a competitive, technology-intensive and knowledge-based global 
economy, skilled human resources are one of the most important factors 
for a country’s success (Statistics Canada, 1997). Investing in continual 
skills development is crucial not only for workers and employers but also 
for Canada’s development and competitiveness (Achieving Excellence, 
2002; Knowledge Matters, 2002). With a declining working (prime) age 
population, training to improve employability of workers is more important 
than ever (OECD, 2006b; Saunders, 2006).
THEORY AND THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF 
LOW-PAID WORKERS’ ON-THE-JOB TRAINING
In terms of the theory of employer-sponsored training, labour economics 
research largely uses Becker’s (1962, 1964) investment in human capital 
theory. The investment in human capital can occur via formal training in 
a structured training environment or can be informal, on-the-job, training. 
Becker’s theory (1964) suggests that a worker should pay for any general 
training which leads to acquiring new skills and earn higher wages, and the 
employer should pay only for firm-specific training. As the theory suggests, 
in competitive markets, workers themselves will have the incentive to 
improve their general skills because they are the sole beneficiaries of the 
improvements in their productivity. Based on the theory, there is a strong 
argument that government regulations and subsidies for training are not 
necessary (Acemoglu and Pischke 1999a).
The evidence contradicts the predictions of Becker’s theory on training 
(Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998, 1999a) and suggests that the theory is more 
a way of understanding the investment in human capital in its pure form 
1. We use higher-paid rather than high-paid since this group includes those earning 
marginally above $10 to the highest hourly rate workers.
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than a description of what can be observed in practice (Ahlstrand, Bassi 
and McMurrer, 2003). Acemoglu (1997) and Acemoglu and Pischke’s 
(1998, 1999a and b) theory of training presents that when the current 
employer, relative to other employers, has superior information regarding 
its employees’ abilities, this information provides a monopsony power and 
encourages the employer to provide and pay for training, even if the skills 
are general. Workers do not pay for the general training received. Labour 
market regulations and institutions and their impact on the structure of 
wages play a significant role in employers’ willingness to provide and pay 
for training. Referring to the institutional structure of the German labour 
market with its protections for dismissal, strong union movement and 
supporting apprenticeship system, Acemoglu and Pischke’s theory shows 
that in non-competitive labour markets wages are compressed, encouraging 
employers to invest in general training. This situation contrasts with the 
U.S. labour market where the incidence of employer provided general 
training is limited and the labour movement and regulatory protections are 
weak. Acemoglu and Pischke (1999a) argue that the best way to increase 
productivity in a given profession is likely to be via on-the-job training that 
builds upon a strong general purpose education achieved through formal 
schooling.
The topic of on-the-job training is also of interest to human resources 
management researchers, but that literature focuses on how workers learn 
and there is no theory to guide our analysis. The practice in the field shows 
that employers train for three purposes: to increase the productivity or the 
performance of workers, to achieve organizational goals, and to invest in 
workers to succeed in the unpredictable and turbulent business environment 
(Belcourt, Wright and Saks, 2000).
Our study is based on the foundations of Acemoglu (1997) and 
Acemoglu and Pischke’s (1998, 1999a and b) training theory in labour 
economics along with empirical research findings in labour economics 
and practice-based knowledge in human resources. We examine training 
experiences of low-paid and higher-paid workers and the determinants 
of their on-the-job training. Next we compare low-paid and higher-paid 
workers with respect to their likelihood of receiving on-the-job training. 
Based on the theory and existing research, we expect workers in low-paid 
jobs to have less opportunity for on-the-job training as compared to workers 
in higher-paid jobs.
There are a number of workplace and individual factors that, 
independently and collectively, influence an employer’s tendency to provide 
on-the-job training. Workplace characteristics studied here are the size of 
the workplace, innovation introduced in the workplace, and the industry. 
In terms of size, although research shows that large workplaces are more 
3 Zeytinoglu p 5 a.indd   8 2008-03-15   09:28:44
9LOW-PAID WORKERS AND ON-THE-JOB TRAINING IN CANADA
likely to provide formal training than smaller workplaces (Chaykowski 
and Slotsve, 2003; Turcotte, Léonard and Montmarquette, 2003), training 
research shows that those employed in small workplaces are more likely 
to receive on-the-job training relative to the reference group of large 
workplaces (Zeytinoglu and Cooke, 2006). Bernier (2005) suggests that 
for her sample of small and medium size businesses such decisions do not 
only depend on the managers themselves but are also influenced or even 
constrained by the characteristics of their institutional environment. In terms 
of on-the-job training and innovation introduced in the workplace, studies 
(Chowhan, 2005; Zeytinoglu and Cooke, 2006) are presenting a positive 
association with innovation and on-the-job training. In terms of the effects 
of industry on training, research shows that on-the-job training accounts 
for a significant share of training in the manufacturing industries (Turcotte, 
Léonard and Montmarquette, 2003).
The individual characteristics studied here as possible determinants 
of on-the-job training are collective agreement coverage, age, gender, 
immigrant status, education, occupation, full-time work experience, marital 
status, and presence of dependent children. Recent Canadian evidence shows 
a positive effect of unionization on training (Livingstone and Raykov, 2005). 
An OECD (2006b) study shows that the incidence of training declines 
with age, though Turcotte, Léonard and Montmarquette (2003) found that 
the probability of taking on-the-job training is not significantly associated 
with age. Research results are mixed for gender and training. While some 
show that women receive less training than men (OECD, 2006a; Sussman, 
2002), others report women to participate more than men in all types of 
training including on-the-job training (Simpson and Stroh, 2002). Recent 
immigrants, who are also predominantly visible minorities, face more labour 
market difficulties than earlier immigrants and Canadian-born workers 
(Picot, Hou and Coulombe, 2007; Picot and Sweetman, 2005), including 
low training (OECD, 2006a). Lin and Tremblay’s (2003) literature review 
shows that on-the-job training is positively associated with education level 
and those with a university degree or higher are more likely to receive 
on-the-job training than workers with a college degree or lower, though 
Turcotte, Léonard and Montmarquette (2003) found no significant effect 
of education on on-the-job training. In terms of occupation, managers, 
professionals and technical workers are more likely to take classroom 
training than on-the-job training while business and sales staff and unskilled 
production workers receive on-the-job training rather than formal training 
in a classroom environment (Lin and Tremblay, 2003; Turcotte, Léonard 
and Montmarquette, 2003). Administrative staff takes either classroom or 
on-the-job training (Turcotte, Léonard and Montmarquette, 2003). On-
the-job training is high in the initial years of employment and gradually 
declines as tenure increases (Lin and Tremblay, 2003). In terms of the 
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effects of dependent children on training, a recent study showed that family 
responsibilities or lack of child care were barriers for job-related training for 
almost 20 percent of workers and this was more significant among women 
and those aged 25 to 44—the group most often responsible for child care 
or household tasks (Sussman, 2002).
METHODOLOGY
Data
This paper uses Statistics Canada’s Workplace and Employee Survey 
(WES) 2001 employee micro data linked to workplace (i.e. employer) 
micro data. WES draws its employer sample from the Business Register 
maintained by the Business Register Division of Statistics Canada. The 
employee sample is provided by the surveyed employers. WES surveys firms 
of all sizes and in all industries, with the exception of employers in public 
administration; crop production and animal production; fishing, hunting 
and trapping; private households; religious organizations; and employers 
in Yukon, Nunavut and Northwest Territories (WES Compendium, 2003). 
The advantage of the WES is that it links employer and employee responses 
of the surveyed sample. It provides more accurate estimates of the effect 
of particular firm and worker characteristics and gives an indication of 
how the attributes of the employees and firms’ activities jointly affect 
training decisions (Lin and Tremblay, 2003). The 2001 WES has data on 
20,377 employees from 6,223 workplaces, with a response rate of 88% 
and 91% respectively (for more on sampling and sample design, see WES 
Compendium, 2003). For this study the data is separated into low-paid and 
higher-paid sub-samples among the weighted 8.8 million workers with a 
regular (continuous) full-time job.
Variables
The dependent variable is the “incidence of on-the-job training.” 
Respondents were asked “in the last 12 months, have you received any 
informal training related to your job (that is, on-the-job training)?” (coded 
as 1 = Yes, 0 = No). Workplace size refers to the number of workers on 
the company payroll in the last pay period, and is in four categories: “Very 
small” (workplaces with less than 30 workers), “Small” (workplaces with 
30-99 workers), “Medium” (workplaces with 100-499 workers), and 
“Large” (workplaces with 500 or more workers). “Innovation introduced 
in the workplace” is a variable created by summing responses to four 
questions: “Between April 1st last year and March 31st this year, has this 
workplace introduced new goods or services? Improved goods or services? 
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New processes? Improved processes?” Those who said yes to all four are 
coded as 4 = very high level innovators, those who said yes to three are 
coded as 3 = high level innovators, those with yes to two are 2 = middle 
level innovators, those with yes to one are 1 = low level innovators, and 
those said no to all are 0 = non-innovators. Industry is coded into three as 
“Primary sector” (forestry or mining), “Manufacturing and related sector” 
(manufacturing and related, construction, transportation, warehousing, 
wholesale, communication or other utilities), and “Service sector” (retail 
trade and consumer services, finance and insurance, real estate, rental and 
leasing, business services, education and health services, or information 
and cultural industries).
“Collective agreement coverage” is a dummy dichotomous variable 
with positive responses to “in [my] current job, I am a member of a union 
or covered by a collective bargaining agreement” coded as 1. Worker 
age is coded into three categories as “Younger” if under 25 years of age, 
“Middle age” if between 25 and 50, and “Older” if over 50 years. For 
“Gender”, female is coded as 1 and male as 0. Immigrant status is coded 
as “Canadian-born” for those who are not immigrants, “Earlier immigrant” 
for those immigrated before 1996, and “Recent immigrant” for those who 
immigrated since the start of 1996. The latter are those who have been in 
Canada for at least five years at the time of the survey. For the education 
level attained, those who have only completed high school or with less than 
high school education are coded as 1 = “Lower education” and those with 
some post secondary degree, certificate, diploma or university degree or 
higher are coded as 0 = “Higher education.” Occupation is coded into three 
categories: manager or professional, lower white collar worker (marketing/
sales or clerical/administrative), and blue collar worker (technical, trades 
or production worker with no trade). Tenure is presented as full-time work 
experience (in years) and full-time experience squared. For marital status, 
single, separated, divorced or widowed are coded as 1 under the heading 
“single,” and married or those in a common-law relationship are coded 
as 0. “Dependent children” variable is a dummy variable with 1 = have 
dependent children.
Analysis
Data analysis consists of descriptive statistics, correlations, multivariate 
regression analyses and a decomposition of the regression results. First, 
univariate statistics are provided among a sample of all regular full-time 
workers. Afterwards, comparable statistics are shown separately for low-
paid and higher-paid regular full-time workers. Next, bivariate correlations 
are investigated between all variables. Due to space limitations, the 
correlation table is not presented but is available from the authors upon 
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request. We then examine the associations between on-the-job training and 
workplace and individual characteristics among low-paid and higher-paid 
workers separately via multivariate logistic regression analysis. The general 
model estimated is:
where P is the probability of receiving on-the-job training, X represents the 
determinants of training, β is the vector of logit coefficients, ε is a random 
error, and i denotes the individual employee. The decomposition discussion 
below follows the Yun (2004) presentation:
Y = F (Xβ) (1b)
where equations (1a) and (1b) are equivalent expressions.
For both low-paid and higher-paid workers, we present the odds ratios, 
regression coefficients, and bootstrapped standard errors for each variable, 
as well as the Wald chi-square as an indicator of model fit. In logistic 
regression, odds ratios provide a meaningful indication of the statistical 
relationship with the dependent variable. For example, an odds ratio that 
is closer to zero than to one is a reasonably strong indicator that those 
exhibiting certain characteristics are relatively unlikely to receive on-the-job 
training. It is important to note that an odds ratio and regression coefficient 
contain the same information on the relationship between the dependent 
variable and the independent variables (Menard, 2001) with one showing 
the probabilities and the other presenting the direction of association. In our 
discussions of the effect of the independent variables, we use odds ratios 
since they are easier to interpret in logistic regression.
Next we compare low-paid and higher-paid workers with respect 
to their probability of receiving on-the-job training. To compare low-
paid to higher-paid workers, two models are estimated, the first using 
the higher-paid workers (H) sample (nH) and the second using the low-
paid workers (L) sample (nL). These estimates are then used to derive 
predicted probabilities using different combinations of estimates and 
data. There are four combinations: 1) probability of on-the-job training 
for higher-paid workers, 2) probability of on-the-job training for low-paid 
workers, 3) probability of on-the-job training for higher-paid workers, if 
the coefficients are equal to the low-paid workers’ coefficients, and 4) 
probability of on-the-job training for low-paid workers, if the coefficients 
are equal to the higher-paid workers’ coefficients. These combinations, 
corresponding to equations 2a–2d, are used in the decomposition discussed 
below:
1n ( Pi ) = Xi β + εi (1a)
  1 – Pi
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ˆYHH = F(XH  ˆβH) (2a)
ˆYLL = F(XL  ˆβL) (2b)
ˆYHL = F(XH  ˆβL) (2c)
ˆYLH = F(XL  ˆβH) (2d)
All of the analyses have been generated using weighted micro data 
accessed at Statistics Canada Research Data Centre at McMaster. The 
analyses use the recommended WES mean bootstrap weights via the file 
developed by Chowhan and Buckley (2005) and Piérard, Buckley and 
Chowhan (2004). All presented descriptive statistics are weighted as 
recommended by Statistics Canada (see WES Compendium, 2003).
Limitations of the Study
Although this study clarifies the relationship between low-paid workers 
and incidence of on-the-job training, a few potential limitations are worth 
noting. First, while the incidence of (i.e. received) on-the-job training is 
important, ideally this would be supplemented by other measures, such as 
training quality or intensity, which are not included in this study.
Second, although we define incidence of training to be the same as 
receiving training, it is likely that a small number of workers were offered, 
but declined, training. Thus, selection bias exists if the characteristics of 
those declining training are different, on average, from other workers. There 
is also selection bias if there is some unidentified reason why workers 
receive training aside from their wage level and the set of control variables. 
While we did not adjust for selection bias, we included a large number of 
job, industry, and individual characteristics to minimize the likelihood of 
overlooking an influential variable. (Interested parties are recommended to 
see Turcotte, Léonard and Montmarquette, 2003 for an example of adjusting 
for selection bias in a training study.)
Third, it is important to note that the results imply that low-paid workers 
have lower incidence of on-the-job training. However, it is also likely that 
workers with insufficient training are more likely to be low-paid since they 
are less attractive candidates for higher-paying jobs. Thus, the incidence of 
training potentially affects wages and wages potentially affect the incidence 
of training. Moreover, it is reasonable to expect that other factors not in the 
model could affect wages and access to training simultaneously.
One of the themes that emerges from the reviewed literature is that 
in today’s labour market, particularly with respect to relatively vulnerable 
workers, employers determine who does or does not receive training. This 
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implies that employers’ strategies potentially impact training access. Thus, 
fourth, a potential limitation of our study is that the data does not allow 
us to control for firms’ strategy/policy effects regarding the allocation of 
on-the-job training.
Last, in a cross-sectional study such as this, we are unable to determine 
causation even when strong statistical relationships between variables are 
detected. Notwithstanding these limitations, the results provide evidence 
for policy-makers.
Sample Characteristics
Descriptive statistics of all variables are presented in Table 1. Since 
the statistics in Table 1 are based on regular full-time workers employed in 
business locations registered in the Business Register, they differ from the 
Canadian labour market. For example, employees in public administration 
are not included. In addition, in our study, regular part-time, casual or on-
call, term and seasonal employees are not included.
Of the sample included in the study, about two-fifths are employed in 
very small workplaces. The remainder are fairly evenly split between small, 
medium, and large workplaces, albeit with fewer in the latter. Similarly, 
about two-fifths of Canadian workers are employed in non-innovating 
workplaces. At the other extreme, almost one quarter is employed by a 
very high innovator. The remaining third of workers are found within low, 
middle, or high level innovator groups. In terms of industry, about two-fifths 
work in the manufacturing or related sector, three-fifths work in the service 
sector, and only a few are employed in the primary sector.
About a quarter of regular full-time workers are covered by a collective 
agreement. Three-quarters of workers are categorized as middle aged, with 
about one in ten being younger and one in five considered to be older. 
Slightly fewer than half are female. About 80% of regular full-time workers 
in our study are Canadian-born, close to one in five are earlier immigrants, 
and only about 3% are recent immigrants. Less than one third of workers 
have lower education, with the remainder having attained a higher level. 
Twenty-nine percent are in managerial/professional jobs, about one in five 
is in a lower white collar job, and more than half of workers are in a blue 
collar occupation. The average full-time work experience exceeds 17 years. 
More than two thirds are either married or in a common-law relationship. 
Fewer than half have dependent children.
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TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics of All Variables
Proportions/ Means All Workers Only Low-Paid Only Higher-Paid
Low-waged  14.0 100.0   0.0
Higher-waged  86.0   0.0 100.0
(Received) On-the-job training  31.6  22.1  33.2
Size of the workplace:  
 Very small workplace  39.3  58.4  36.2
 Small workplace  23.9  27.2  23.4
 Medium workplace  21.0  11.7  22.5
 Large workplace  15.8   2.7  17.9
Innovation in the workplace:  
 Non-innovator  38.0  46.2  36.7
 Low level innovator   9.5  10.1   9.4
 Middle level innovator  17.6  18.3  17.4
 High level innovator  10.9   8.0  11.4
 Very high level innovator  24.0  17.4  25.1
Industry:
 Primary sector   1.8   0.1   2.1
 Manufacturing & related sector  38.4  22.5  41.0
 Service sector  59.8  77.3  56.9
Collective agreement coverage  24.1   8.9  26.6
Age:  
 Younger   8.8  25.8   6.0
 Middle  72.9  59.9  75.0
 Older  18.3  14.3  18.9
Gender (i.e. female)  46.4  58.0  44.5
Immigrant Status:  
 Canadian-born (not immigrant)  79.1  79.4  79.0
 Earlier Immigrant  18.3  16.9  18.6
 Recent Immigrant   2.6   3.7   2.4
Education:  
 Lower education  30.6  54.3  26.8
 Higher education  69.4  45.7  73.2
Occupation:  
 Manager/Professional  29.2   6.6  32.9
 Lower white collar  18.8  30.5  16.9
 Blue collar  52.0  62.8  50.2
Full-time work experience*  17.3  12.5  18.1
Full-time work exp. squared* 410.4 270.1 433.3
Marital Status:  
 Married/Common-law  69.5  55.1  71.9
 Single  30.5  44.9  28.1
(Have) Dependent children  47.6  36.6  49.4
  
Weighted sample size 8,765,247 1,229,549 7,535,699
Sample: All regular full-time workers.
Note: * indicates the mean value, rather than proportion.
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RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics of On-the-Job Training
As shown in Table 1, the proportion of low-paid regular full-time 
workers in Canada is 14%, while 86% are higher-paid. Among all regular 
full-time workers, 32% receive on-the-job training. Among low-paid 
workers, however, the proportion drops to 22%. That contrasts with 33% 
among higher-paid workers. Although not shown in a table, the bivariate 
correlation between the receipt of on-the-job training and being low-paid is 
–.08, which is significant at the p < .01 level. In the following section, we 
examine whether this finding remains when controlling for other factors.
Regression Results of On-the-Job Training among 
Low-Paid Workers
As shown in Table 2, very few of the variables included in our study are 
significantly associated with on-the-job training among low-paid workers. 
Relative to middle-aged workers, younger workers are less likely to receive 
on-the-job training when controlling for other factors, although the gap is 
significant only at p < .10. At that same weak significance, full-time work 
experience is negatively associated with on-the-job training among low-
paid workers. Those who are higher educated are almost twice as likely 
to receive on-the-job training among low-paid workers. None of the other 
variables reach the threshold of statistical significance.
Regression Results of On-the-Job Training among Higher-Paid 
Workers
As shown in Table 3, several variables included in our study are 
significantly associated with on-the-job training among higher-paid workers. 
Relative to those in a very small workplace, workers in a small or large 
workplace are significantly more likely to receive on-the-job training. Those 
in more innovative workplaces are also significantly more likely to receive 
on-the-job training. Those with collective agreement coverage are less likely 
to receive on-the-job training. Relative to middle-aged workers, younger 
workers are more likely while older workers are less likely to receive on-the-
job training. Higher educated workers are more likely to receive on-the-job 
training compared to lower-educated workers in this higher-paid sample. 
Relative to blue-collar workers, those in managerial/professional jobs are 
significantly more likely to receive on-the-job training. However, there is 
no significant difference between lower white-collar and blue-collar workers 
in terms of receiving on-the-job training within the higher-paid sample. 
Albeit at a weak level of significance (i.e. p < .10), recent immigrants are 
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more likely to receive on-the-job training as compared to Canadian-born 
workers. Those with higher (full-time) work experience are more likely to 
receive on-the-job training, though at a weak level of significance. Other 
variables show no significant association with on-the-job training within 
the higher-paid sample.
TABLE 2
Associations with On-the-Job Training among Low-paid Workers
(Logistic regression)
Odds Ratio Reg. 
Coeff.
(BS Std. Error)
Workplace Size [Very small workplace]
 Small workplace  0.747 –0.292 (0.291)**
 Medium workplace  1.020  0.020 (0.364)**
 Large workplace  0.765 –0.268 (0.657)**
Innovation in the workplace  1.007  0.007 (0.086)**
Industry [Manufacturing & related]
 Primary sector  1.014  0.014 (1.447)**
 Service sector  1.471  0.386 (0.272)**
Collective agreement coverage  1.396  0.333 (0.342)**
Age [Middle]
 Younger  0.461 –0.774 (0.416)**
 Older  0.436 –0.830 (0.604)**
Gender (i.e. female)  0.805 –0.217 (0.263)**
Immigration status [Canadian-born]
 Earlier immigrant  0.671 –0.399 (0.420)**
 Recent immigrant  0.460 –0.777 (0.556)**
Education [Lower Education]
 Higher education  1.869  0.625 (0.274)**
Occupation [Blue collar]
 Manager/Professional  1.121  0.114 (0.437)**
 Lower white collar  1.233  0.209 (0.309)**
Full-time work experience  0.931 –0.071 (0.038)**
Full-time work experience squared  1.001  0.001 (0.001)**
Marital status [Married/Common-law]
 Single  1.638  0.493 (0.299)**
(Have) Dependent children  0.814 –0.206 (0.359)**
Constant –1.073 (0.506)**
 
Number of Observations  1,314
Wald Chi-Square 30.020
Prob > Wald  0.052
Pseudo R-Square  0.075   
Significance levels: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
Excluded reference categories are shown in brackets, where appropriate.
Sample: Regular full-time workers earning under $10/hour.
3 Zeytinoglu p 5 a.indd   17 2008-03-15   09:28:44
18 RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES / INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, 2008, VOL. 63, No 1
TABLE 3
Associations with On-the-Job Training among Higher-paid Workers
(Logistic regression)
Odds
Ratio
Reg.
Coeff.
(BS Std. Error)
Workplace Size [Very small workplace]
 Small workplace   1.292  0.256 (0.115)***
 Medium workplace   1.110  0.104 (0.113)***
 Large workplace   1.464  0.381 (0.147)***
Innovation in the workplace   1.107  0.101 (0.025)***
Industry [Manufacturing & related]
 Primary sector   1.072  0.069 (0.136)***
 Service sector   1.161  0.149 (0.097)***
Collective agreement coverage   0.805 –0.217 (0.083)***
Age [Middle]
 Younger   1.794  0.584 (0.154)***
 Older   0.623 –0.474 (0.136)***
Gender (i.e. female)   1.070  0.068 (0.076)***
Immigration status [Canadian-born]
 Earlier immigrant   1.087  0.084 (0.105)***
 Recent immigrant   1.799  0.587 (0.310)***
Education [Lower Education]
 Higher education   1.497  0.404 (0.092)***
Occupation [Blue collar]
 Manager/Professional   1.361  0.308 (0.099)***
 Lower white collar   1.112  0.106 (0.118)***
Full-time work experience   1.022  0.022 (0.012)***
Full-time work experience squared   1.000  0.000 (0.000)***
Marital status [Married/Common-law]
 Single   1.011  0.011 (0.094)***
(Have) Dependent children   0.769 –0.263 (0.090)***
Constant –1.582 (0.160)***
 
Number of Observations  14,981
Wald Chi-Square 158.100
Prob > Wald   0.000
Pseudo R-Square   0.038
Significance levels: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
Excluded reference categories are shown in brackets, where appropriate.
Sample: Regular full-time workers earning at least $10/hour.
Decomposition of Logistic Regression Results
To test whether workers in low-paid jobs have less opportunity for on-
the-job training as compared to workers in higher-paid jobs, we conduct 
logistic regression decomposition, following the techniques developed by 
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Oaxaca (1973), Gomulka and Stern (1990), Picot and Myles (1996), Oaxaca 
and Ransom (1999), Yun (2004), and Fairlie (2005).
Referring to equations 2a–2d (presented above), the predicted 
probability for each of these equations is calculated by using the two 
portions of the data (the higher-paid and low-paid workers samples). This 
approach differs from the more commonly used method of analysis, which 
defines a base set of characteristics and then measures the probability of 
an event. This commonly used method is restrictive, because it does not 
take into consideration the non-linearity of the marginal effects. Using 
the two portions of the data is more general and takes full advantage of 
the data rather than being restricted to arbitrarily chosen “base employee” 
(Chowhan, 2005).2
The mean difference between higher-paid and low-paid employees is 
calculated as follows (Yun, 2004):
(3)
where the average probability of the binary outcomes can be described 
as:
(4a)
(4b)
(4c)
(4d)
To decompose the total effect     , the change between higher-
paid and low-paid workers is evaluated by looking at the summation of
the component endowment          and coefficient effects
         . The endowment effect is the differences in the average 
predicted outcome due to the different observable characteristics (given 
the estimated coefficients). The coefficient effect is the difference in the 
2. This analysis has not measured the contributions of any single variables, and no sequential 
replacement techniques have been applied to estimate the endowment and coefficient 
effects of individual variables. Thus, the decomposition is free from path dependency.
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outcome due to differences in behaviour (or the estimated coefficients given 
individual characteristics) of the groups (Oaxaca, 1973).
The decomposition measure is not unique to the expression in equation 
(3). The decomposition can also be expressed as follows:
(5)
Notice that the first portion of the expression is the coefficient effect and 
the second portion is the endowment effect. These two expressions do not 
produce identical results; however, most research using these decomposition 
techniques presents both results and the average of the two.
The differences in the decisions/choices to train higher-paid workers 
relative to low-paid workers are approximated by the coefficient effect after 
the endowment effect is subtracted from the overall total of higher-paid and 
low-paid worker difference in the probability of on-the-job training. The 
large coefficient effect indicates the significant importance of behaviour 
differences of higher-paid relative to low-paid workers (see Table 4). The 
endowment effect is not substantially different from zero indicating that 
the individual characteristics of the workers do not affect their likelihood 
of training.
Standard errors have been directly calculated for these decomposition 
effects of average predicted on-the-job training incidence for both the 
endowment and coefficient effects, again using the 100 mean bootstrap 
weights provided with the WES data. Standard errors are not calculated 
for the mean effects. Therefore, conclusions can be made about the 
individual endowment and coefficient effects from Table 4, but the mean 
effects have to be tentative, although given the combined significance of 
both coefficient effects this is suggestive of a significant mean coefficient 
effect. The individual endowment effects have mixed results with equations 
(4a–4d) yielding a significant effect of .0139 and equations (4c–4b) giving 
an insignificant effect of –0.0053: thus, the significance of the combined 
mean effect is uncertain.
The decomposition of higher-paid and low-paid workers demonstrates 
that a gap exists between these workers in the level of on-the-job training 
they receive. The factors influencing the gap are not the endowments of 
the workers, but the behaviour (decisions/choices) of the workplaces and 
workers in the higher-paid and low-paid worker groups.
[ ] [ ])ˆ()ˆ()ˆ()ˆ(ˆˆ LLLHLHHHLLHH XFXFXFXFYY ββββ −+−=−
3 Zeytinoglu p 5 a.indd   20 2008-03-15   09:28:45
21LOW-PAID WORKERS AND ON-THE-JOB TRAINING IN CANADA
TABLE 4
Decomposition of High and Low Paid Workers
on the Job Training Differential
Component Effect Bootstrap 
Standard 
Error
p-Value 5th Percentile 95th Percentile
Endowment Effect: equations 
 (4a-4d)
 0.0139 0.00583 0.0190 0.0023 0.0255
Endowment Effect: equations 
 (4c-4b)
–0.0053 0.00835 0.5230 -0.0219 0.0112
Mean Endowment Effect  0.0043  --  --  --  -- 
Coefficient Effect: equations
  (4d-4b)
 0.0973 0.00917 0.0000 0.0791 0.1156
Coefficient Effect: equations
  (4a-4c)
 0.1166 0.00240 0.0000 0.1118 0.1213
Mean Coefficient Effect  0.1070  --  --  --  -- 
Total Effect: equations 
 (4a-4b)
 0.1112 0.00821 0.0000 0.0949 0.1275
Significance levels: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
Sample: All regular full-time workers.
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS OF FINDINGS
In this study we examined the extent of on-the-job training among 
low-paid and higher-paid workers and workplace and individual factors 
associated with their on-the-job training. Results showed that, as expected, 
workers in low-paid jobs have less opportunity for on-the-job training as 
compared to workers in higher-paid jobs. About 22% of low-paid workers 
receive on-the-job training while 33% of higher-paid workers receive on-
the-job training.
Consistent with the literature on training (Lin and Tremblay, 2003), 
our results focusing on low-paid workers show that those who are higher 
educated are more likely to receive on-the-job training. Younger, less 
experienced workers in low-paid jobs are less likely to receive on-the-
job training, consistent with the OECD findings (2006b) and Lin and 
Tremblay’s (2003) literature reviews, though contrary to Turcotte, Léonard 
and Montmarquette (2003) findings. None of the other workplace and 
individual variables reached the threshold of statistical significance for 
low-paid workers’ on-the-job training.
Among higher-paid workers, however, several variables were 
significantly associated with on-the-job training. Relative to those in a 
very small workplace, higher-paid workers in a small or large workplace 
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are significantly more likely to receive on-the-job training, as are those 
in more innovative workplaces. These findings are consistent with the 
literature on training (see, for example, Chaykowski and Slotsve, 2003 and 
Turcotte, Léonard and Montmarquette, 2003). Among higher-paid workers 
those who are higher educated or those in managerial/professional jobs are 
more likely to receive on-the-job training, consistent with earlier findings 
(Lin and Tremblay, 2003). Our results show that higher-paid workers with 
collective agreement coverage are less likely to receive on-the-job training. 
In terms of age, relative to the middle-age reference group, younger workers 
are more likely to receive on-the-job training while older workers are less 
likely, results similar to OECD findings (2006b). Among the variables in 
the two regression models, education appears to be the most significant.
Results from the logistic regression decomposition between higher-
paid and low-paid workers indicate that, as expected, the gap in on-the-job 
training received is not due to the low-paid workers’ endowment relative to 
higher-paid workers, but it is behavioural and depends on the workplace’s 
decision/choice to offer and workers’ decision/choice to accept training. 
This outcome suggests policy approaches should focus on workplace and 
employee decision-making.
Overall, the results are consistent with the emerging literature showing 
that working conditions in Canada are polarized (e.g., Betcherman and 
Lowe, 1997; Moore and Pacey, 2003; Johnson and Kuhn, 2004; Zeytinoglu 
and Cooke, 2005), and that training is not distributed equitably among 
workers (OECD, 2006a; Saunders, 2006). The low level of on-the-job 
training provided to low-paid workers creates an opportunity cost for 
the Canadian economy given well-documented benefits that accrue from 
training to the society as well as the individual (Goldenberg, 2006; OECD 
2006a; Statistics Canada, 1997). Given the identified gap in training between 
low-paid workers and higher-paid workers, the question remains whether 
there can be a role for public programs to close the gap in training between 
workers grouped by wage-level, if workplaces and employees do not take 
action independently (or without an appropriate incentive structure).
For governments facing scarce resources and considering support for 
on-the-job training, we suggest targeting the intervention on the training 
choices of low-paid workers and the workplaces that hire them. Targeting 
the low-paid worker group and providing workplaces and employees 
incentives to offer and accept training, respectively, with further incentives 
to reward training performance will lead to the direct effect of improved 
human capital and increased productivity. Some effort toward targeting low-
paid workers is already in progress: for example, in Ontario the government 
started the process by initiating an academic upgrading programme for 
“adults in low-wage low-skill employment” (Government of Ontario, 
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2006). This program will enable these workers to attain Ontario Secondary 
School Diploma equivalent certification. We encourage governments in 
Canada to initiate targeted programs and support them on an ongoing basis. 
However, we would go further and suggest that the common element should 
be incentives to encourage training and continued lifelong learning with 
focused performance rewards.
Benefits of on-the-job training will not only accrue to the individual. 
Externalities may be generated resulting in government support contributing 
not only to the human capital of low-paid workers but also to their 
communities. Concurring with Lalonde (1995), we believe that the social 
return to a society where financial support is provided for on-the-job training 
will likely exceed the private benefit/cost ratio to the firms. While the 
traditional cost/benefit research shows government intervention provides 
modest benefits to participants (Leigh, 1995), this is because we get what 
we pay for and the indirect effects of training programs on non-participants 
are not considered well (Heckman, Lalonde and Smith, 1999). Similar to 
Heckman, Lalonde and Smith (1999) and Lalonde’s (1995) discussion, we 
believe that the social benefit of training programs for low-paid workers is 
not only to trained individuals but also to their families, community and the 
society. The indirect effect of training low-paid workers can be improved 
social health, i.e. improved standard of living, lower crime rate in the 
society, and improved individual and community security and well-being 
(Warburton and Warburton, 2002), along with workers’ feeling of dignity 
(Berg and Frost, 2005).
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RÉSUMÉ
La formation en cours d’emploi au Canada : le cas des 
travailleurs à faible rémunération
Les données statistiques sur les travailleurs vulnérables recueillies par 
les Réseaux canadiens de recherche en politiques publiques font voir bien 
des aspects défavorables de la vie de travail des travailleurs faiblement 
rémunérés et le manque de protection sociale liée à un emploi (voir, par 
exemple, Chaykowski, 2005; Saunders, 2003 et 2006; Vallée, 2005). Cet 
essai s’intéresse avant tout aux travailleurs permanents à plein temps et 
faiblement rémunérés. Dans notre mire, se trouvent ces travailleurs qui 
sont couverts par des contrats de travail à durée indéterminée, engagés 
à plein temps et payés moins de 10 $ l’heure en 2001, ce qui inclut ceux 
qui gagnent le salaire minimum ou légèrement plus. Le but de ce travail 
consiste à documenter la nature de la formation offerte en entreprise aux 
travailleurs à faible rémunération en la comparant avec celle offerte aux 
travailleurs bien rémunérés au Canada et à circonscrire les facteurs tant 
individuels que ceux liés au milieu de travail associés à la formation en 
cours d’emploi. L’étude retient les données de l’Enquête sur le milieu de 
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travail et les employés de Statistique Canada de 2001. L’unité d’analyse 
est le travailleur individuel et les données retenues sont celles qui relient 
les réponses des salariés à celles des employeurs. Notre étude se base 
sur les fondements de la théorie de la formation en économie du travail 
d’Acemoglu (1977) et d’Acemoglu et Pischke (1988, 1999a, 1999b) et 
sur des conclusions de recherches empiriques en économique du travail 
et en gestion des ressources humaines. Nous analysons les liens entre la 
formation en cours d’emploi et les caractéristiques des individus et des 
milieux de travail chez les travailleurs faiblement rémunérés et ceux qui 
bénéficient d’une rémunération élevée, cela séparément et à l’aide de la 
technique de l’analyse de régression logistique multivariée. Par la suite, 
nous comparons les deux populations de travailleurs quant à la probabilité 
de se voir offrir de la formation en cours d’emploi. Afin de savoir si les 
travailleurs moins bien rémunérés ont moins d’occasions de formation de ce 
type que les travailleurs mieux rémunérés, nous procédons à une ventilation 
de la régression logistique (Oaxaca, 1973; Picot et Myles, 1996; Fairlie, 
2005). La probabilité estimée pour chacune des équations est calculée en 
retenant les deux parties des données (les échantillons des bien rémunérés 
et des faiblement rémunérés).
Les résultats montrent que la proportion des travailleurs permanents à 
temps plein à faible rémunération dans l’enquête de 2001 mentionnée plus 
haut atteint 14 %, alors que les travailleurs bien rémunérés comptent pour 
86 %. Parmi les travailleurs permanents à plein temps, 32 % reçoivent de 
la formation en cours d’emploi et cette proportion diminue à 22 % chez les 
moins bien rémunérés. Cette donnée contraste avec celle des travailleurs 
bien rémunérés qui s’établit à 33 %. Les résultats de la régression montrent 
que chez les moins bien rémunérés, les travailleurs plus jeunes et ceux qui 
présentent une expérience de travail plein temps sont moins susceptibles de 
recevoir de la formation en cours d’emploi, alors que ceux qui ont un niveau 
de scolarité plus élevé le sont presque deux fois plus. Chez les travailleurs 
bien rémunérés, ceux qui détiennent des emplois dans des milieux de travail 
restreints ou bien très vastes, des milieux de travail innovateurs, possédant 
un niveau élevé de scolarité, étant plus jeunes, se retrouvant dans des 
occupations de professionnels et de gestionnaires, bénéficiant d’une riche 
expérience de travail plein temps et ceux qui sont des immigrants récents 
sont les plus susceptibles de se voir offrir de la formation en cours d’emploi. 
Par ailleurs, parmi ces travailleurs bien rémunérés, ceux couverts par une 
convention collective et les plus âgés sont moins susceptibles de recevoir 
de la formation.
Les résultats obtenus de la ventilation de la régression entre les 
travailleurs bien rémunérés et ceux qui le sont moins bien indiquent que 
l’écart au plan de la formation en cours d’emploi reçue n’est pas attribuable 
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aux aptitudes naturelles des travailleurs à faible rémunération par rapport à 
celles des autres travailleurs, mais le phénomène est d’ordre comportemental 
et dépend des décisions et des choix de formation offerts par les directions 
et des décisions d’acceptation et des choix effectués par les travailleurs 
eux-mêmes. Les conclusions invitent à des approches de politique qui se 
centreraient sur les milieux de travail et sur la prise de décision par les 
salariés. Étant donné l’écart identifié au plan de la formation entre les 
travailleurs moins bien rémunérés et ceux qui bénéficient d’une rémunération 
plus élevée, il faut se demander si des politiques publiques pourraient aider 
à réduire cet écart entre les deux groupes de travailleurs, si les employés et 
les entreprises ne prennent pas d’initiative autrement (ou bien en l’absence 
d’un encadrement approprié et incitatif). Aux gouvernements qui font face 
à des ressources rares et qui s’apprêtent à offrir un appui à la formation 
en entreprise, nous suggérons de cibler leurs interventions sur les choix de 
formation chez les travailleurs moins bien rémunérés et dans les entreprises 
qui les engagent. En ciblant ces travailleurs et en offrant aux entreprises 
et aux salariés des incitations à offrir de la formation et à l’accepter, en y 
ajoutant également des incitations qui viendraient récompenser le rendement 
de la formation, cela aurait un effet direct sur l’amélioration des personnes 
et sur la productivité. Il se fait actuellement un certain effort en ce sens, 
par exemple, en Ontario, où existe un programme de rattrapage scolaire 
pour les adultes dans des emplois offrant de bas salaires et exigeant peu de 
compétences (Gouvernement de l’Ontario, 2006). Nous suggérons aussi 
d’encourager la formation et l’apprentissage durant toute la vie, associés 
à des récompenses ciblées sur le rendement. Alors, les bénéfices de la 
formation en cours d’emploi ne profiteraient pas seulement à la personne. 
Des avantages secondaires (ou externes) pourraient être générés, qui 
découleraient de l’appui du gouvernement en contribuant non seulement 
au capital humain des travailleurs moins bien rémunérés mais également 
à leur communauté. En corroborant Lalonde (1995), nous pensons que le 
rendement social, dans une société où un support financier est fourni en 
matière de formation en cours d’emploi, excéderait le ratio coûts/bénéfices 
privés aux entreprises. Dans la même foulée que les conclusions des études 
faites par Heckman, Lalonde et Smith (1999) et par Lalonde (1995), nous 
croyons que les avantages sociaux des programmes de formation offerts 
aux travailleurs faiblement rémunérés vont aux individus formés, à leur 
famille, à leur communauté et à la société. L’effet indirect de cette formation 
pourrait aussi se traduire par un bien-être et une santé améliorés (Warburton 
et Warburton, 2002), et un sentiment de dignité chez les travailleurs (Berg 
et Frost, 2005).
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